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ABSTRACT
We present a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in
which, unlike most existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The
government finds it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its
bargaining position. In a model of redistribution to lobbies, the government finds it optimal to cap
the size of lump-sum transfers it makes below the unconstrained equilibrium level. With a binding
cap on efficient subsidies in place, less efficient subsidies will be used for redistribution even when
they serve no economic function. Analogously, if it must choose either efficient or inefficient
transfers, it may find it optimal to forego use of the former if its bargaining power relative to the
lobby is sufficiently low. Even if the lobby can bargain over the type of redistribution policy with
the government, the inefficient policy may still be used in equilibrium. If policymakers are elected,
rational fully informed voters may choose a candidate who implements the inefficient policy over
one who would implement the efficient policy and may prefer the candidate with the lower weight
on voter welfare We thus offer an alternative theory that explains why governments may optimally
choose to restrict efficient lump-sum transfers to interest groups and replace them with relatively
less efficient transfers.
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Why might governments choose to use ineﬃcient policies when more eﬃcient ones are available
for a similar purpose? Transfers to eﬀect redistribution provide a very good example, one that is
especially relevant due to the importance of redistribution as a function of government. Motivations
for redistribution are well understood. It can arise from concern over equity or more generally as the
political economy outcome due to voting or lobbying. The methods used for redistribution are much
less well understood. Speciﬁcally, why do governments often use ineﬃcient policies to redistribute
income towards diﬀerent special interest groups (SIG)? For example, governments universally use
trade policy to redistribute income towards particular factor owners, with many models explaining
which factor owners and sectors are more successful in this redistribution process. But, why is it
carried out using tariﬀs, never a ﬁrst-best instrument for redistribution, as opposed to a production
subsidy? Similarly, why are production subsidies used for redistribution when, in the absence of
production externalities, lump-sum payments would be more eﬃcient?1
In this paper we oﬀer an alternative theory that explains why governments may optimally choose
to restrict eﬃcient lump-sum transfers to SIG and replace them with relatively less eﬃcient transfers.
We consider a world in which the government values both social welfare and a good given by SIG.
In exchange for the goods provided by the SIG the government can makes transfers potentially using
one or more alternative policies that can be ranked in terms of their relative eﬃciency. The outcome
is determined by bargaining.
Our basic argument may then be understood in two parts. We ﬁrst show that if transfers are
lump-sum and neither party has all the bargaining power, it will be optimal from the government’s
perspective to put a binding cap ex-ante on the lump-sum transfer it can oﬀer. This cap improves
the bargaining position of the government by limiting the maximum oﬀer it will ever make for a
given level of the good provided by the SIG. The second part of the argument is then to show that
with a cap on eﬃcient transfers in place, less eﬃcient ones will be used for redistribution even when
they serve no economic function. To put the argument another way, if these ineﬃcient transfers were
replaced by eﬃcient ones, the government would be in a worse bargaining position and ultimately be
worse oﬀ. Hence, the government preference for a cap on eﬃcient transfers and the use of ineﬃcient
ones. We also justify why some relatively ineﬃcient policy is always available to bargain over. The
1In reviewing the literature on the political economy of trade policy Rodrik (1995) states: “Of course trade policy
is not the only, or even the most important, mechanism of redistribution used by governments. But practically all
governments apparently use it for that purpose. A suﬃciently general and convincing explanation for this phenomenon
has yet to be formulated” (p.1476).
1most compelling argument is that a SIG can always ﬁnd some government policy that it can beneﬁt
from and the government can’t credibly rule out all of these ex-ante.
A special, but leading case of these results is one where the government can’t set an optimal
c a po nt h er e l a t i v e l ye ﬃcient policy but can choose to either have a cap at zero or no cap at all.
This is equivalent to asking whether, given a binary choice between two policies, a government will
ever choose to completely forego the relatively eﬃcient transfer and use only the ineﬃcient one. To
answer this we must consider two oﬀsetting eﬀects. Switching to the ineﬃcient policy improves the
government’s bargaining position, as already described. However, the bargaining surplus available
to the government and SIG is also reduced. If the government had all the bargaining power and
therefore collected all the surplus it would never switch to the ineﬃcient policy. But governments
with suﬃciently low bargaining power may choose to switch because the loss in surplus from switching
is small, so that the eﬀect on government bargaining position is likely to be the dominant eﬀect. We
provide a general condition that reﬂe c t st h i st r a d e - o ﬀ and can be used to determine a government’s
choice between a pair of policies that can be ranked in terms of their relative eﬃciency. We also
verify that the condition can be satisﬁed for the policies we use to illustrate the results of the model:
lump-sum transfers versus production subsidies.
The absence of lump-sum (i.e.,e ﬃcient) transfers in practice suggests that the government faces
this type of binary choice. In this case, we would observe no examples of explicit caps on eﬃcient
transfers to support our modeling mechanism of caps. This may be why we can only ﬁnd indirect
evidence for the use of caps that are potentially motivated by a politician’s desire to improve its
bargaining position.
We also consider the determination of caps or the type of policy itself by bargaining or elections.
First, even if the SIG can bargain over the type of redistribution policy with the government (rather
than it being chosen unilaterally by the government or exogenously speciﬁed) the ineﬃcient policy may
still be used in equilibrium. Second, if the policymaker is elected, rational fully informed voters who
vote solely on the basis of what type of redistribution policy will be used in equilibrium may choose
a candidate who implements the ineﬃcient policy over one who would implement the eﬃcient policy.
In fact rational voters may prefer the candidate with the lower weight on voter welfare, because such
a politician may be in a better bargaining position with organized lobbies and hence deliver higher
welfare to unorganized groups. The full information nature of the electoral results contrasts with
disguised transfer arguments where the electoral success of politicians favoring ineﬃcient transfers
requires imperfect voter information, which we discuss below.
2These results have a number of interesting implications. First, to constrain itself the government
requires a commitment device even though no time consistency problem is present. Therefore the
model provides a reason why governments choose to sign international agreements that would appear
to have no tangible beneﬁt other than to limit their policy options. Second, for the same reason
of strengthening a government against special interest groups, fully informed, rational voters may
choose policymakers who favor ineﬃcient policies over those who favor eﬃcient ones Third, the model
generates a speciﬁc testable prediction. Namely that the probability of use of a relatively ineﬃcient
redistribution policy towards a lobby is positively correlated with its bargaining power relative to the
politician.2
1.1 Some examples
Here are some examples in line with our approach. Consider ﬁrst caps on transfers, where one should
keep two points in mind. First, since a government may face the choice of using lump sum transfers
with no restrictions or not using them at all, observing only non-lump-sum (i.e., relatively ineﬃcient)
transfers in redistributing income may be consistent with the government choosing a cap, namely
zero, on more eﬃcient transfers. Second, it should not be surprising if the government does not
oﬃcially state that the reason for such limits is to improve its own well being.
In terms of caps on transfers agricultural policy provides one example. In the 1930’s the U.S.
federal government initiated an agricultural policy with the objective of providing income support
to farmers. Currently, expenditure on farm price and income support is about $18 billion a year.
Historically the transfers have been based on a variety of price distorting policies such as price
supports, production subsidies and trade policies. In 1996 the Freedom to Farm Act introduced
direct payments to farmers subject to annual caps stipulated for the 6 years until the legislation was
due for revision. The 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act tightened some of the payment
limits in the 1996 Act and included a cap on individual programs. There is also a constraint on
total expenditure under the program agreed to by the US in the context of the WTO. The recent
changes in the US and the EU towards more eﬃcient means of transfers to farmers may also provide
some evidence that is consistent with the model’s prediction. If the continuing decline of agriculture
in GDP for the EU and US and of farmers’ inﬂuence has translated into a loss of bargaining power
relative to the government then the model predicts precisely that governments would optimally switch
to more eﬃcient transfer policies.3
2We use the terms lobby and special interest group (SIG) interchangeably.
3“The 2002 Farm Act also requires the Secretary, ‘to the maximum extent practicable, to adjust domestic commodity
3Welfare payments are often also subject to such limitations. Federal bloc grants to states for
welfare payments are capped. For example TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) entitles
States to ﬁxed bloc grants and was implemented with a cap of $16.5 billion annually for 6 years. One
of the reported reasons for the adoption of the caps was to control the cost of the transfers under the
program that it replaces, the AFDC. Another example is the Social Services Block Grant Program
that is also subject to a cap of $1,700 million in 2001.
A potentially credible way for a government to commit to limits in the use of redistribution policies
and thus improve its bargaining position against domestic lobbies is to be bound by international
agreements that are costly to break. Here are some examples. The Stability and Growth Pact
constrains European Union governments’ budget deﬁcits and debt levels. These constraints have
been used to increase the government’s leverage in negotiations with domestic interests as suggested
by our model. In Portugal the government has used the Pact as a key argument to limit wage
increases in the public sector when negotiating with unions 4
Regional and multilateral trade agreements provide another important example of commitment,
which can be partially explained by our model. The WTO allows countries to bind their tariﬀsa ta
ceiling level, under the threat of tariﬀ retaliation if that commitment is broken. Similarly regional
trade agreements allow a country to commit to a limit on its use of trade barriers. Moreover, currently
one of the main concerns in trade agreements is that as the limits on tariﬀs and other basic measures
of protection are set other, less eﬃcient methods of redistribution, such as standards that discriminate
against foreign products, are increasingly used. This is consistent with the prediction of our model
that once the government commits to a limit on a redistribution policy the lobbies ﬁnd and pursue
redistribution via relatively less eﬃcient ones.
1.2 Literature
Several arguments have been presented to explain why politicians use relatively ineﬃcient means to
redistribute income to SIG. Perhaps the most prominent is the “disguised” transfer argument put
forward by Tullock (1983). When a policy is not ostensibly aimed at redistribution, those who bear
the costs may be largely ignorant of the redistribution taking place and are thus less likely to oppose
it, particularly if the policy also has some social welfare beneﬁt. Coate and Morris (1995) elegantly
program expenditures to avoid exceeding allowable’ WTO domestic support ceilings. The Uruguay Round Agreement
on Agriculture put a maximum allowable level on trade-distorting domestic support programs, as measured by the
aggregate measurement of support (AMS). The ceiling on the U.S. AMS fell from $23.1 billion in 1995 to $19.1 billion
in 2000.” Westcott, Young, and Price (2002), p. 10.
4“Portugal Chafes Under the Yoke of Austerity” Financial Times Sep 25, 2002.
4formalize this idea. They consider a world in which transfers to SIG can be made as lump-sum cash
payments or by building public projects, which beneﬁt SIG, but also possibly the population as a
whole. While cash transfers reveal that a politician is catering to SIG, uncertainty both about the
social value of a project and about the motives of politicians allows politicians who favor SIG to
disguise their redistributive intent.
Disguised transfer arguments make clear why ineﬃcient transfers may be used if there is asymmet-
ric information about the value of the project and the aims of politicians. Were there full information
about the motives of politicians and the eﬀects of policies, there could no disguising of redistribu-
tion. If done at all, redistribution to SIG would be done by eﬃcient means. In contrast, information
asymmetries about the function of a policy play no role in our model. Everyone knows exactly how
much redistribution is taking place and who is beneﬁtting. But despite full information we show that
ineﬃcient transfers can still arise in a political equilibrium. Moreover, because there is no disguised
transfer motive in our model, the ineﬃcient redistribution policy used need not have any social welfare
value.
A second leading argument is that governments that want to reduce the amount of redistribution
to SIG can do so by committing to using less eﬃcient forms of transfers. This general type of argument
has been presented by Rodrik (1986), Wilson (1990), and Becker and Mulligan (1998). For example,
Becker and Mulligan consider competition over transfers between two interest groups that partially
internalize the deadweight cost of taxation to provide these transfers. A less eﬃcient tax system
increases these deadweight costs and hence leads to lower total transfers in the equilibrium resulting
from the interaction of SIG with one another. Ineﬃcient policy is like “sand in their wheels”.
In our model, the use of ineﬃcient transfers also reduces total transfers, implying higher social
welfare, with the government’s desire to limit the amount transferred to SIG determining the type of
transfers used. However, our approach is fundamentally diﬀerent from that of Becker and Mulligan,
and this diﬀerence in approach has important implications. First, we rule out lobby competition,
which is the main source of their result. Second, in that paper, as well as in Becker (1983), the
approach is to use a general “inﬂuence function”, meant to be a reduced form of the political process.
Its properties, it is argued, make it consistent with many political processes. This is seen, quite
reasonably, as an advantage of this approach, as its predictions about the implications of policy
ineﬃciency should therefore be similarly general. On the other hand, the approach leaves unanswered
a key question: what policy is chosen in a political equilibrium? It is clear that a social welfare
maximizing government may prefer ineﬃcient to eﬃcient means of redistribution, but will that be
5the policy outcome? The focus on competition between SIG, rather than between SIG and the
government highlights the same point. In Becker and Mulligan, as in the other papers mentioned
above, the eﬀects of policies on the amount of redistribution in equilibrium is modeled, but not the
choice of policy itself. In a sense, the government is in the background.5
In contrast, we consider a more structural model with a speciﬁc type of interaction between
government and SIG. The government is an active player whose behavior is explicitly modelled.
Hence, the policy choice is endogenous, allowing us to ask what redistribution policy will be used as
a function of the bargaining power of government relative to SIG. Since the government beneﬁts from
the ineﬃcient transfer policy and is in a position to implement it, the use of the ineﬃcient policy is a
characteristic of the political equilibrium. Moreover, even within our structural model some important
results depend on the relative bargaining power. Therefore a general “inﬂuence function” approach
may not capture certain important aspects and therefore fail to predict interesting outcomes.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue that political institutions cannot credibly commit to future
policies, which will be determined by whomever has political power at the time the policy is actually
determined. Political power is positively correlated with group size, and ineﬃcient transfers may be
especially eﬀective in maintaining or increasing group size. For example, agricultural subsidies will
keep farmers from moving into other sectors. Diﬃculties of committing to future policy may also
help explain the use of ineﬃcient forms of transfer if one believes that they are harder to reverse than
eﬃcient forms of transfer. In contrast, in our approach group size is assumed unchanged over time,
with no eﬀect of one type of policy versus another on group size. Hence, the key consideration in the
Acemoglu-Robinson explanation play no role in our mechanism.6
In terms of the formal approach, the closest work to ours is Grossman and Helpman (1994), and
Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), who pioneered models of bargaining between government and
SIG based on utility maximization. Our set-up parallels theirs, but with some crucial diﬀerences.
Foremost among them is our assumption that neither side has all the bargaining power, in contrast
to their “menu-auction” approach in which the SIG make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the government.
We will show that this diﬀerence is crucial in a number of respects. For example, in their papers,
competition among SIG to receive government transfers implies that more distortionary instruments
may improve the bargaining position of the lobby. Competition among lobbies is not the driving force
of our mechanism and in our model it is the government that can beneﬁt from choosing relatively
5It also leaves unanswered why a social welfare maximizing government would ever make transfers to SIG at all.
6Other arguments are that speciﬁc types of transfers give political beneﬁts that lump-sum transfers do not (Shepsle
and Weingast [1981], Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen [1981], and Dixit and Londregan [1995]) or that the institutional
details of the legislative process by which transfers are chosen is crucial (Fiorina [1981], Baron [1991]).
6more ineﬃcient policies.
As we pointed out our model also provides a simple motivation for governments of small countries
to constrain themselves by signing international agreements. Most explanations for countries signing
such agreements rely on their role as a commitment device to overcome a time inconsistency problem
(Staiger and Tabellini [1987], Maggi and Rodriguez [1998]). In contrast the government in our model
does not face any of the typical time consistency problems. 7
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the economic setup and political
economy interaction. Section 3 contains the basic results regarding how a government can increase
its welfare by capping the use of the eﬃcient redistributive policy. In section 4 we add an ineﬃcient
transfer and show how it will be used alongside the eﬃcient transfer as a means of transferring income
to SIG when it has no social value. In section 5 we derive a general condition for the government to
opt for using only a relatively ineﬃcient transfer policy and show when it is satisﬁed by the speciﬁc
pair of policies we use. In section 6 we derive the equilibrium redistribution policy when we extend
the model to allow either the lobby or voters to interact with the government in the initial stage. In
the ﬁnal section we summarize our results.
2 The Model
2.1 Economic structure
We consider a small open economy in which individuals are similar except, possibly, for diﬀerent
endowments of non-labor factors. We represent utility as:
u ≡ xn +
X
ui(xi) (1)
where the subutility functions, ui, are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. The
term xn, represents the consumption of the numeraire good, n, which is produced using labor with a
marginal product of unity. This along with the assumption of a ﬁxed world price of n at unity and a
suﬃciently large labor force ﬁxes the wage at unity. The exogenous world price for other goods is pi.
7Maggi and Rodriguez (1998) use a setup similar to Grossman and Helpman (1994), but do not allow SIG to have all
the bargaining power, which is crucial for their results, as it is for ours. If the government of a small country has access
only to tariﬀs when bargaining with SIG, they show it can gain from committing to free trade if it has low bargaining
power. In our model there is no time inconsistency; the gain to the government from self-restraint (which might be
achieved via international agreements) is explained by the improvement in its bargaining position relative to the lobby.
Moreover, Maggi and Rodriguez are not interested in explaining the use of ineﬃcient transfer policies, tariﬀsi nt h e i r
case. They simply assume that more eﬃcient transfer policies are not present. In contrast, the main purpose of our
paper is precisely to explain the use of less eﬃcient transfer policies.
7For given prices an individual who owns the speciﬁcf a c t o ri has income Ei and chooses consumption
to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, xn +
P
i pixi ≤ Ei. Given the assumptions on the
subutility, the budget constraint is satisﬁed with equality and individuals demand d(pi)=u0(pi)−1
of each of the non-numeraire goods. An individual’s indirect utility is simply the sum of income, Ei,
and consumer surplus s(p)=
P
u(d(pi)) − pid(pi).
Production of the non-numeraire goods requires labor and a speciﬁcf a c t o rt ob ec o m b i n e da c -
cording to a constant returns technology. Since the wage is unity the return to the speciﬁcf a c t o r
depends only on the supplier price of the good, ps
i. The reward is given by the quasi-rent πi(ps
i) and
equilibrium output is π0
i(ps
i). In the absence of production taxes, tariﬀs or trading costs ps
i = pi.
To redistribute income to lobbies of capital owners in sector i the government may use combi-
nations that include a lump-sum transfer, Ti , or other types of transfer, which for concreteness we
summarize by a unit production subsidy, ti.8 Transfers to lobbies are ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes
charged on the voting population of N individuals. We allow for a unit collection cost of β ∈ (0,1),
which is the same independently of whether it is spent as T or t. We assume that the government
balances its budget every period, so that a total transfer of τ requires the government to collect







An exogenously given set of sectors L form lobbies and their gross welfare is:
Wi = li + π(pi + ti)+Ti + αiN[s − τ/(1 − β)N] if i ∈ L (3)
where αi is the share of the voting population that owns factor i and li is their labor income.
Each lobby can transform some amount Ci of the numeraire into a good that it oﬀers to the
politician in exchange for an increase in a transfer to itself, in the form of Ti or ti. We assume that
factor ownership in any one particular lobby is suﬃciently concentrated, i.e. αi is suﬃciently small,
such that it takes the size of the budget, τ/(1−β), as given and does not lobby for it to be reduced.
We do so to maintain our theory focused on the interaction between the government and the lobbies
in the absence of any lobby competition eﬀects. Thus the lobby maximizes its gross welfare net of
8Note that in a small open economy the consumer prices are determined by the world price so they are independent
of the production subsidy. Production subsidies aﬀect quantities produced and lowers individuals’ income but this will
only result in lower consumption of the numeraire good.
8its provision of lobby goods, which is given by:
Vi ≡ Wi − Ci (4)
Social welfare is obtained by summing the indirect utility over individuals in and out of lobbies:
W ≡ l +
X
i π(pi + ti)+
X
i Ti − τ/(1 − β)+Ns (5)
The government objective is a weighted sum of social welfare and lobby provided goods.
G ≡ aW +
X
i∈L Ψi(Ci) (6)
where we assume that each lobby good is valued according to a function Ψ, which is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. We also assume that limC→0 Ψ0(C)=∞ and Ψ(0) = 0.W em o d e l
lobby goods as additively separable in the government’s objective because it helps us to concentrate
on the interaction between the government and the SIG, rather than on competition among SIGs.
Additive separability and concentrated factor ownership (αi → 0) implies that there is no economic
interaction among lobbies, so that it is clear that our results are not driven by lobby competition.
Lobby competition is an interesting issue, but we want to look for important eﬀects elsewhere.
Moreover, in several instances interest groups lobby for policies such as production subsidies in their
own sector so modelling away motives for lobby competition is not only convenient but also a plausible
representation.
As we will see, the strict concavity of Ψ is a technical assumption that ensures an interior solution
in the benchmark case when only lump-sum transfers are used.9 But this formulation has a natural
economic interpretation: the government values lobby goods in a way similar to the evaluation of
private non-numeraire goods, xi, by individuals. This interpretation of diminishing marginal utility
of C is reasonable if the SIG are providing not simply cash but goods or valuable services to politicians,
as for example, in Drazen (2002). Concavity in each of the Ci is consistent it being a “good” that
can be supplied only (or primarily) by that lobby.10
9When C enters the government’s objective function linearly, there will be a corner solution in the trade of C for
T. In the corner solution in which T (and C) are zero, then ineﬃcient transfers t will be zero as well. Further, as will
be clear below, our assumption that the marginal ineﬃciency of t rises as t rises implies that concavity of Ψ(·) is not
necessary for the Pareto frontier with ineﬃcient transfers to be concave.
10This is primarily to ensure the additive separability and model away lobby competition. However, there may be
examples where this formulation is reasonable such as when a geographically concentrated lobby ensures the turnout
of members in a local event or election. Another example is given by Vlasenko (2003) who argues that privatized ﬁrms
in Russia keep employment high in their sectors or regions in exchange for legal barriers preventing the entry of new
92.2 Political structure
The structure and timing of the interaction between the government and lobbies is as follows. In an
initial stage the government chooses a cap on the amount of the transfers it can make or which of
the redistribution policies it will use.11 In the second stage the government and each of the lobbies
bargain over a level of the lobby provided good and government transfers. The additive separability
and concentrated factor ownership for organized groups eliminates the interaction across lobbies and
so we drop the subscript i and discuss the results relative to a given SIG. We model the outcome of
the interaction in the second stage as the solution to a Nash bargaining problem. We can interpret
this solution as a bilateral game of alternating oﬀers with an exogenous, constant risk of breakdown
of negotiations in each round or if players discount the future (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky
[1986]). We do not specify the institutional structure which might imply a game of alternating oﬀers,
but we would argue that the “give-and-take” that such a game is meant to represent is a key feature
of the interaction of politicians and lobbyists.12
A key feature of the bargaining process is that neither side has all the bargaining power, that
is, neither side can make a “take-it-or-leave-it” oﬀer. This is in contrast to Grossman and Helpman
(1994) and Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997), in which the lobbies can make a take-it-or leave-it
oﬀer in the form of a “menu” of contributions in exchange for diﬀerent levels of a policy instrument.
At the other extreme, is the veto player model of Drazen (2002) that assumes the government chooses
the policy vector, which SIG can either accept or reject. Our assumption that neither side has all
the bargaining power is necessary for the key results and highlights the importance of considering
alternatives to the extremes represented by the government or lobby as veto players.
3B e n c h m a r k c a s e : E ﬃcient Transfers
We begin with a benchmark case where only lump-sum transfers are available to show that the
government optimally chooses to cap it below the unconstrained solution. Figure 1 illustrates the
unconstrained solution. The vertical axis denotes lobby goods to the politician, the horizontal axis
transfers to the lobby. The line V 0 represents the lobbies’ reservation utility, i.e. when it provides
none of the lobby good and receives no transfer. From (3) and (4), the lobby is indiﬀerent between
providing the lobby good and receiving an eﬃcient transfer of the same amount so the slope of
ﬁrms.
11In section 6 we discuss a more general formulation where the adoption of caps or choice of ineﬃcient policies in the
ﬁrst stage is subject to a popular vote or to bargaining with lobbies.
12In our working paper, we show that proposition 1 also holds under the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
10V is unity since we are assuming that α goes to 0. Any movements towards the southeast leave
the lobby better oﬀ. The government’s reservation utility is denoted by G0. It is upward sloping
because the negative eﬀect of a transfer paid to the lobby (due to the cost of raising tax revenues)
must be compensated by an increase in the lobby good received. The slope is increasing because we
assume that Ψ is concave to ensure an interior solution. Movements to the northwest improve the
government’s welfare. If the marginal rate of substitution of lobby goods for transfers is lower for the
government then the lobby at the origin then lobbying will be “politically eﬃcient”. This is satisﬁed
given our assumption on Ψ0.13
The segment gmvm in Figure 1 that deﬁnes the contract curve is horizontal because G and V are
quasilinear in T. Therefore, provided the transfer is in the range [T0,T1], that is provided that both
the lobby and government are assured their reservation utilities, the unconstrained level of the lobby










where GT, etc. are partial derivatives. Thus, as expected, the equilibrium level of lobby goods
provided is decreasing with respect to the weight that the politician places on social welfare, a,a n d
the cost of collecting taxes, β.
To determine the equilibrium level of the lump-sum transfer we must consider the division of the
surplus that arises from the Nash bargaining solution.
MaxG≥g0,V ≥v0 U =( G − g0)γ(V − v0)1−γ (8)
s.t. G = gm −
aβ
1 − β
(V − v0) (9)
Given that the Pareto frontier given by (9) is linear the solution can be written as
gN − g0 = γ(gm − g0) (10)
vN − v0 =( 1 − γ)(vm − v0) (11)
Of the total surplus that is potentially available to the government over its reservation utility, it
receives a share proportional to its bargaining power, γ. Similarly for the lobby. It is then simple to
13The precise condition is aβ/(1 − β)Ψ
0(0) < 1, which is satisﬁed because limC→0 Ψ
0(C)=∞.
11solve for the bargained level of the eﬃcient transfer, TN.
We now allow the government to cap the eﬃcient transfer. No alternative transfer policies are
yet available, an assumption which we relax in the next section. The timing of actions is the fol-
lowing. In the ﬁrst stage the government chooses the cap Tc to maximize its objective function,
G(CNc(Tc),TNc). In the second stage the government and lobby bargain over the lobby good CNc
and the level of the transfer TNc ≤ Tc, taking the cap as given. Our objective is to show that the
subgame perfect equilibrium level of the cap Tc strictly binds, i.e. that the government is strictly
better oﬀ by setting a cap below the unconstrained transfer previously derived.
Solving backwards suppose that the cap is given by Tc in Figure 2. The contract curve is now
deﬁned by the kinked segment gmcvmc. Note that if the cap is greater than or equal to T0,t h e
transfer consistent with government utility level gm, then the government can still assure the lobby
its reservation utility, v0, and therefore the government’s maximum utility is unchanged relative to
the unconstrained solution. But for the cap to be binding it must be strictly less than TN and
therefore the maximum utility for the lobby is lower than vm a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 .
At the point where the cap binds, the lobby can only be made better oﬀ by reducing its provision
of the lobby good to the government. Relative to the unconstrained solution it is feasible to ﬁnd
solutions such as Nc, which leave the government better oﬀ then N.P r o p o s i t i o n 1 s h o w s t h a t a
binding cap leaves the government strictly better oﬀ and therefore would be optimally chosen by the
government in the ﬁrst stage.
Proposition 1 :
In the absence of alternative transfer policies to lobbies the government chooses a cap on the eﬃcient
transfer that is strictly binding at (CN,TN) iﬀ neither player has all the bargaining power.
Proof: See Appendix
To understand the basic intuition for this result note that the cap limits the maximum utility a
lobby can obtain from dealing with the government. More importantly, by setting a cap that binds
at the unconstrained Nash solution the government credibly commits to transferring less than TN in
exchange for CN. It is this commitment to a lower transfer that explains why the cap improves the
government’s bargaining position. This improvement in bargaining position can also be interpreted
as an improvement in the government’s terms-of-trade. By constraining its supply of transfers that
are to be traded for the lobby good the government improves its own terms-of-trade.
12Graphically the improvement in the government’s bargaining position is captured by a steeper
Pareto frontier, as shown in ﬁgure 4. The dashed straight line represents the frontier in the benchmark
case, (9), point N is the unconstrained Nash solution. The constrained frontier coincides with the
original until the cap binds, after which point the lobby can only be made better oﬀ by oﬀering less
C. This has an increasing cost for the government given the concavity of Ψ(.), hence the concave
Pareto frontier. Using this we can show that the government can always ﬁnd a binding cap that
leaves it strictly better oﬀ, Nc, relative to the unconstrained solution, N,p r o v i d e dγ ∈ (0,1).
The cap also raises social welfare, which may be seen as follows. Government utility is G =
aW + Ψ(C). Since a cap increases government’s utility G and unambiguously lowers C (and hence
Ψ(C)), it must unambiguously raise social welfare W. This may also be seen directly. The only
eﬀect of the cap on consumers is via the taxes they must pay to ﬁnance transfers. The fall in the
equilibrium level of transfers relative to the unconstrained solution that is induced by the cap reduces
taxes. Since taxes are costly to raise, the cap unambiguously increases social welfare.
The proposition also makes clear the importance of allowing for a more general distribution of
bargaining power between the government and the lobby. There is no strict gain for the government
from setting a cap if it has neither all nor none of the bargaining power. Thus political economy
approaches that focus on take-it-or -leave-it oﬀers by the government or by the lobby completely miss
the insight in this proposition.
4I n e ﬃcient and Eﬃcient Transfers
We now expand the policy space to allow for transfers that are not lump-sum. We show that the
government continues to set a cap on the eﬃcient transfer and, more importantly, that the equilibrium
will feature redistribution that uses the relatively ineﬃcient policy.
Ineﬃcient transfers to producers can occur via numerous instruments of industrial policy such as
loan guarantees, tax breaks, unit production or export subsidies, price supports, etc. Even in the
absence of lobbying, a welfare maximizing government may want to use the production subsidy, for
example, as a way to correct a production externality. Hence, a government may choose not to cap
or outright prohibit the use of a production subsidy, even if it were feasible to do so. Evidence for
this is found in the WTO agreement on subsidies, which rules out the use of production subsidies
targeted at ﬁrms or industries but it allows subsidies aimed at correcting market failures, e.g. if
they are aimed at education, infrastructure or R&D. In our working paper, we explicitly consider the
case in which a production subsidy may be used to address a production externality whose size may
13vary over time, in order to motivate the optimality of not capping the ineﬃcient transfer at zero.
Moreover, in practice, it may not be possible for the government to prohibit every possible form of
ineﬃcient transfer. Both in this last case or when the policy can be used to correct an externality the
government leaves itself open to credible lobby oﬀers of lobby goods in exchange for further transfers,
which are potentially less eﬃcient.
For concreteness, we consider the case of a production subsidy, which allows us to show unam-
biguously that the ineﬃcient transfer is used when T is optimally capped. Considering production
subsides may be further justiﬁed either by their pervasiveness in several countries or because they
represent a simple summary measure for diﬀerent type of production related policies. To show clearly
what is driving our results, we deliberately rule out any economic function for the subsidy, so that
its optimal social level is zero. Therefore it is known that production subsidies are used only for
redistribution and there is never a beneﬁt for politicians to use them as disguised transfers. Such a
beneﬁt may exist, as argued by Tullock (1983) and Coate and Morris (1995), and could clearly be
modelled here but doing so would confuse the source of our result.
4.1 A formal deﬁnition of ineﬃciency
When the interaction between government and lobbies involves possible welfare gains for both when
transfers are exchanged for lobby goods, we may ask what does it mean to say a transfer is “in-
eﬃcient”? And, how does it relate to the economic functions (or lack of them) of transfers? The
following deﬁnition (and related Lemma 1 in the appendix) addresses these questions.
Deﬁnition: Policy t is an ineﬃcient transfer policy relative to T iﬀ there are no joint political
gains from trade between the government and lobby by lowering T and increasing t above the social
welfare maximizing level of t ≡ text.T h a ti st∗ = text where {T∗,t ∗} ≡ argmaxT,t(G(( ¯ C,.)+V ( ¯ C,.)).
The social welfare maximizing value for t is zero in the absence of externalities. This deﬁnition
then requires that no joint gains are possible from using t as a transfer to partially replace T,t h e
lump-sum transfer.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h i sd e ﬁnition of ineﬃciency becomes clearer if we consider an externality that
can be corrected by using t. In this case, the social optimum requires text > 0 and t would not
be an ineﬃcient policy according to the deﬁnition above. We show this formally in the appendix.
Intuitively, when there is an externality and t = text the marginal social cost of increasing t is close
to zero but the marginal beneﬁt to the lobby in this sector is strictly positive since it is already
14receiving the subsidy. Hence, when the policy has a social value, observing a value of t greater than
the social welfare optimum text implies that the government is making a transfer but also that it is
actually using an eﬃcient policy for that transfer, at least at the margin. Therefore, one must be
careful when using the disguised transfer argument as a general explanation for the use of ineﬃcient
policies, as that only applies in periods or states of nature in which the externality is not present.14
4.2 Equilibrium with ineﬃcient transfers
The timing of the two-stage game is the same as before. In the ﬁrst stage, the government commits
to a maximum level of the lump-sum transfer, Tc in order to maximize its objective (6). As discussed
above we assume that the government is either unable to put a cap on the eﬃcient transfer or does
not ﬁn di to p t i m a lt od os o . 15 In the second stage, the government and lobby bargain over the level
of lobby goods and the level of transfers, T and t. In the appendix we present a formal deﬁnition of
the equilibrium.
We now analyze the equilibrium beginning with the second stage, which is represented in Figure 4.
The dashed line represents the Pareto frontier if there were no caps set on T. Therefore it is identical
to Figure 4 up to the cap level, Tc because, in the absence of any externality, T is more eﬃcient than
t and thus it will be the policy used until the cap binds. Any further transfers by the government to
the lobby must then occur in the form of the production subsidy. The Pareto frontier when a cap is
set on T and the production subsidy is used is concave, at least for small values of t.16 This implies
that the government gains from setting a cap on T as shown in proposition 1. In proposition 2 we
show the concavity formally but intuitively it is due to the following. First, because the subsidy is
ineﬃcient relative to the lump-sum transfer the Pareto frontier when t is used lies below the dashed
line. Second, this ineﬃciency disappears when t =0and thus the slopes of the Pareto frontier when
there is no cap on T and the new frontier are identical at t =0 . Third, for the same reason, the new
Pareto frontier is continuous with the frontier when there is no cap on T at t =0 .
Consider now the ﬁrst stage. We will show that the government gains by putting a cap on the
eﬃcient transfer and that in the resulting equilibrium, positive values of the ineﬃcient transfer are
14This issue need not arise in Coate and Morris (1995) because they have valuation of the project that is discretely
diﬀerent in each of two states. They show that the project may be built even in the state where it is socially ineﬃcient
to do so.
15In our working paper, we show that the government’s optimal cap for the ineﬃcient transfer t is strictly positive
when it addresses a time-varying production externality. We also show that t is used for redistribution even if in that
period there is no externality, i.e. when t is ineﬃcient.
16In the ﬁgure drawn we implicitly assume that the Pareto frontier when T is capped and t used is everywhere
concave. This is not essential for the results, concavity for small values of t is suﬃcient and satisﬁed. In the appendix
we present the condition for the Pareto frontier to be globally concave.
15used.17 The basic intuition for the cap on the eﬃcient transfer policy is similar to that in Proposition
1. The government gains from the commitment to make a lower oﬀer. In fact most of the previous
proposition applies directly after we show that the constrained Pareto frontier when t c a nb eu s e di s
concave.
Proposition 2 :
In the political equilibrium, there is:
a. a cap on the eﬃcient transfer, T, that is strictly binding iﬀ neither player has all the bargaining
power; and
b. use of the relatively ineﬃcient transfer policy, t.
Proof: See Appendix
The proposition shows that if the government can cap the eﬃc i e n tp o l i c yi tw i l ld os oe v e ni nt h e
presence of alternative less eﬃcient policies. This is perhaps not surprising given proposition 1, since
the intuition is in fact the same: the cap allows the government to credibly commit to a lower oﬀer.
The observation that as t −→ 0+,w eh a v eGt/Vt = GT/VT, is important to show that the frontier is
strictly concave when we allow for production subsidies.
The second part of the proposition is less obvious. Why is the government making ineﬃcient
transfers in equilibrium? Why not simply increase the cap and make a similar value transfer using
the eﬃcient policy? Doesn’t that leave the lobby better oﬀ and thus willing to provide more lobby
goods, which in turn would leave the government better oﬀ? This argument captures only the
increase in the Pareto set from relaxing the cap. However, this will not translate into an increase
in government welfare because relaxing the cap reduces the government’s ability to make a credible
oﬀer of a low transfer, as shown in proposition 1. Thus the government will not relax the cap.
This is the key conceptual result. By constraining what it is able to oﬀer SIG, the government
can improve its bargaining position in the trade of lobby goods it covets for the transfers that SIG
desire. In the presence of such a constraint, the partial substitutability of a second ineﬃcient transfer
for the more eﬃcient type of subsidy ensures that it will be used in equilibrium. The ineﬃciency
of the second transfer relative to the ﬁrst partially “protects” the gain in the bargaining position
17As before, the cap on the eﬃcient form of transfer will also increase social welfare if C falls, since G = aW +Ψ(C).
However, when the form of the ineﬃcient transfer is a production subsidy per unit produced, it is theoretically possible
that C could rise, since the marginal beneﬁto ft to the lobby is π
0(p + t), which is increasing in t.T or u l et h i so u t ,w e
must ensure that the contract curve in C,t space is always downward sloping. A suﬃcient condition for this is for the
supply function π
0(p + t) not to be too concave or convex, as shown in the appendix.
16the government achieves with the cap; substituting eﬃcient transfer for ineﬃcient subsidies, that is,
loosening the cap only erodes that gain.
Since the subsidy is not ineﬃcient at t =0 ,u s eo ft will create joint gains to the government and
lobby, which provides lobby goods in exchange for a strictly positive level of t. Hence, the equilibrium
value of the ineﬃcient transfer is positive. It is crucial to note that when t is strictly positive it is
strictly less eﬃcient than the original transfer despite it being a perfect substitute at t =0 .
4.3 Export subsidies
Our result in proposition 2 applies to a broader set of policies than production subsidies, as the
following corollary shows. In particular it is interesting to consider the implication of our result
for trade policy, which is universally used to redistribute income towards particular factor owners
even though it is ineﬃcient relative to lump-sum transfers. As Rodrik (1995) points out in his
review of trade policy the use of trade policies as a form of redistribution remains an important
unanswered question in trade. One particularly important transfer policy for developed countries is
export subsidies, particularly in agriculture. Our previous result applies directly to export subsidies
under the following conditions.18
Corollary: If good i is exported when t =0and trading costs and import barriers on i are zero
then a production subsidy is equivalent to an export subsidy and therefore proposition 2 provides an
explanation for the use of export subsidies as a form of redistribution.
The corollary follows simply from the fact that an export subsidy is exactly equivalent to a pro-
duction subsidy under the conditions outlined. Since we have assumed this is a small country the
domestic consumers can purchase the good in the world market at p provided there are no interna-
tional trading costs or barriers on i, so demand for i remains unchanged under an export subsidy.
This implies that any extra production due to the subsidy is exported, and thus the production and
export subsidy are equivalent.
18The WTO prohibits export subsidies on non-agricultural products for developed countries. However, such subsidies
are still used and are in fact the source of some of the most important disputes in the WTO. In late 1997 the EU
brought a complaint against the US’s Foreign sales corporation system which allows any US ﬁrm whose exports have
at least 50% of US content to set up a shell company in a tax haven that “buys” and then exports the product. Up to
65% of its proﬁts are tax free. In 2003 the WTO has ruled in favor of the EU allowing retaliatory measures of up to $4
billion.
175 The Government’s Optimal Redistribution Policy
Thus far we have allowed the government to set optimal caps on policies to clarify how the bargaining
eﬀect works. Moreover, we considered a sole ineﬃcient alternative (a production subsidy) to make
clear it is used when T is optimally capped. Now that we have established how restraining the
use of certain types of policies can improve the government’s bargaining position, we show how this
argument can explain the government’s choice of ineﬃcient policies in more realistic cases.
We don’t often observe governments using the most eﬃcient form of transfers in dealing with SIG.
This suggests that instead of choosing optimal caps on policies, governments often choose simply
whether or not to use the eﬃcient policy instead of a relatively ineﬃcient one. We therefore ask:
Will the government ever choose to forego the eﬃcient transfer completely and instead simply use
al e s se ﬃcient transfer policy? There are two oﬀsetting eﬀects. On the one hand, the improvement
in its bargaining position provides a motive for the government to choose an ineﬃcient policy, since
it can therefore capture more of the existing bargaining surplus. On the other, an ineﬃcient policy
implies a lower total bargaining surplus. If the government has most of the bargaining power anyway,
the reduction in total surplus is the more important eﬀect. Since the government already has most
of the bargaining power, an improvement in the bargaining position is relatively unimportant, so
the government will prefer the eﬃcient policy. Conversely, if the government has suﬃciently low
bargaining power it is likely to gain from switching to an ineﬃcient policy. A reduction in the overall
size of the surplus resulting from a switch to an ineﬃcient policy is relatively less important when the
government is not obtaining much of it to begin with, so that the eﬀect on government bargaining
position is likely to be the dominant consideration.
5.1 A general condition
We now provide a general suﬃcient condition for a government to choose the relatively ineﬃcient
transfer policy. Although we refer to the policies as T and t the general condition is not restricted
to the comparison of lump-sum transfers and production subsidies. The condition applies to any two
given transfer policies that can be introduced in the context of our model and can be ranked relative
to each other in terms of their eﬃciency. For example, we may be interested in comparing the lump-
sum transfer to the production subsidy and the production subsidy to an import tariﬀ. The condition
we derive reﬂects the basic trade oﬀ between bargaining surplus and bargaining position described
above. We also show that the general condition can be satisﬁed in the case of the production subsidy.
The timing of the game now entails an initial stage when the government chooses whether to
18use T or t as a transfer. Once a policy is chosen the government can’t set any type of cap on it.
After choosing which policy will be used the government bargains with the lobby. A government with
bargaining power γ chooses the ineﬃcient policy if
G(T =0 ,t Nt(γ),CNt(γ)) >G (T = TN(γ),t=0 ,CN) (12)
Figure 5 shows that this condition may hold in the case of lump-sum transfers and some ineﬃcient
policy. The line gmvm represents the Pareto frontier when T is used. The curve gmtvmt represents
the frontier when an ineﬃcient policy t is used, which is interior to gmvm because t is ineﬃcient.
Intuitively, (12) is likely to hold for low γ, that is for low government bargaining power. It cannot
hold for γ =0 , since the government then receives its reservation utility, which is identical for T and
t.T h e r e f o r e ,i fa tγ =0the government’s marginal gain from an increase in γ is higher under t then
(12) is satisﬁed for suﬃciently low γ since the government’s maximized objective is continuous in γ.










It is also clear from Figure 5 that, for suﬃciently large γ, the government always chooses T since
at γ =1we have gm >g mt. We represent this in Figure 6 where we plot the government’s maximized
utility as a function of its bargaining power. Therefore, if (13) holds, there must exist at least one
critical point γ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that the government is indiﬀerent between the transfer policies used.19
G(0,t Nt(γ∗),CNt(γ∗)) = G(TN(γ∗),0,CN) (14)
When (14) has multiple solutions, we take as γ∗ the minimum γ satisfying it.
Before stating the proposition it is useful to deﬁne the Pareto frontier when a given policy x = T






.N o t et h a tΩx(0) = 0 and Ω0 x < 0. The slope of the Pareto frontier in Figure 5 is
1/Ω0. We may then show:
Proposition 3 :
a. Given a discrete choice of the transfer policy to use in bargaining with a lobby the government
19Given that g
N is linear in γ,a ss e e ni n( 1 0 ) ,w ec o u l dc h e c kt h a tw h e nγ
∗ exists it is unique by conﬁrming whether
g
Nt is strictly concave for the particular policy t considered. In general if there are multiple γ
∗ we can simply take the
minimum of them when (13) holds to show that when γ ∈ (0,γ
∗) the government chooses t.
19chooses a relatively more ineﬃcient transfer, t, instead of T if:
i. limγ→0(1/Ω0t)/(1/Ω0T) > limγ→0 ΩT/Ωt and
ii. γ ∈ (0,γ∗)
b. Moreover, there exists a γ ∈ [γ∗,1) s.t. the government always chooses T when γ ∈ (γ,1].
Proof: See Appendix
The proposition states that the government chooses t for suﬃciently low γ if the fall in the
surplus from switching to the ineﬃcient policy is small, that is, if limγ→0 ΩT/Ωt is small, relative to
the improvement in the government’s bargaining position, reﬂected by the increase in the steepness
of the Pareto frontier from using t,t h a ti s ,b ylimγ→0(1/Ω0t)/(1/Ω0T). The intuition is exactly as
explained above. To better understand the suﬃcient condition in part (a) of the proposition, consider
Figure 5. For the drawn Pareto frontiers we can ﬁnd γ∗ by simply taking a line through gm tangent
to the Pareto frontier for t. Using a reasoning similar to that in the proof of proposition 1 the solution
when t is used and the auxiliary line is tangent to the Pareto frontier for t entails the same utility
for the government as does the solution when T is used. Thus, the auxiliary lines through gm that
intersect the frontier for t when γ < γ∗ must be less steep than the frontier, when it is strictly concave.
So the solution when t is used involves higher g for γ ∈ (0,γ∗). Part b of the proposition states that
if the government has most of the bargaining power, so that it obtains most of the surplus, it prefers
the policy that maximizes the surplus, i.e., T.
We further note that in general there may be no γ∗ > 0 that satisﬁes (14) so the condition must
be checked for speciﬁc pairs of policies. We now show when the general condition holds for the case
of lump-sum transfers and production subsidies which, as pointed out in a previous corollary, will
also apply to export subsidies in this small open economy.
5.2 Production subsidies versus lump-sum transfers
In the case of production subsidies we have limγ→0(1/Ω0t)/(1/Ω0T)=Ψ0(CNt)/Ψ0(CN),w h e r eΨ0(CN)
is constant as shown in (7). Therefore, for a given level of C,am o r ec o n c a v eΨ(·) implies a steeper
Pareto frontier only for the case of ineﬃcient transfers. As we have argued, a steeper Pareto frontier
implies that the government improves its bargaining position by switching to the ineﬃcient policy.
However, as we consider alternative Ψ(·) functions, the equilibrium levels of Cmt,t and T at γ =0
also change. This could potentially imply that Ψ0(CNt) is lower when Ψ is more concave and/or that
the right hand side of (13) increases, such that a more concave Ψ(·) may not be suﬃcient. A simple
20example will suﬃce to show that, despite any equilibrium responses of the policies, a more concave
Ψ(·) has the eﬀect described and that (13) can be easily satisﬁed in the case of production subsidies.














Ω0t =l i m
γ→0
[
a(βπ0(p + tN)+tNπ00(p + tN))
(1 − β)π0(p + tN)
(π(p + tN) − π(p) − Cmt)]
where Cmt is the minimum level of the good provided by the lobby to maintain the government at
the reservation utility. Using the deﬁnition of G we can write Cmt as a function of tN. Thus we need
only parametrize the production and Ψ(·) functions. We assume Ψ(C) ≡ Cψ and ψ ∈ (0,1),w h i c h
satisﬁes the conditions previously assumed for Ψ(·). Production is Cobb-Douglas with capital share
of 0.5. In the appendix we solve explicitly for the equilibrium production subsidy and evaluate the
slopes at the parameter values listed below. The simulation conﬁrms that when Ψ(·) is suﬃciently




ψ x = t x = T
1/2 0.46 < 0.75
1/4 0.82 > 0.68
Parameters: a = p = k =1 ,β =0 .25,α =0 .5,γ =0
Functions: Ψ = Cψ;q = k.5l.5
Table 1: Simulation result for the choice of lump-sum versus production subsidies
5.3 Choice over multiple redistribution policies
Proposition 3 can be used to compare policies other than the lump-sum transfer and production
subsidy provided that we can rank them in terms of eﬃciency. This implies that we can use the
condition to determine the government’s optimal redistribution policy towards an interest group as a
function of its bargaining power when facing that group. For example we can compare the production
subsidy to the lump-sum transfer and subsequently, if we ﬁnd the production subsidy is chosen for
γ ∈ (0,γ∗), compare the production subsidy with a tariﬀ. For any set of redistributive policies that
can be eﬃciency ranked, we could ﬁnd the range of γ for which each of them is the government’s
most preferred policy. Of course, there will be policies which are not the government’s ﬁrst choice
for any value of γ. This could be represented analogously to Figure 6. That is we could represent for
21each policy x how gNx(γ)−g0 increases as a function of γ. The outer envelope over all the available
policies would then deﬁne the optimal redistribution policy for the government at each level of γ.
Whether a government will use only one or several policies to redistribute income to a SIG depends
on whether or not the policies can be capped at positive levels. If “interior” caps are not possible,
then our bargaining model indicates that only one type of policy will be used — though, as we have
just shown, not necessarily the most eﬃcient one. A key implication of proposition 3 is that when
the government cannot set the optimal cap on eﬃcient transfers it might ﬁnd it optimal to forego
their use entirely, so that we would see only an ineﬃcient policy being used.
When it is possible to put binding caps on the use of some policies, then several redistributive
policies might be used at the same time. The government would cap the relatively more eﬃcient
policy at some positive level. If the less eﬃcient policy cannot be prohibited, these two policies
would coexist. We do sometimes observe two relatively ineﬃcient policies used simultaneously, for
example, production subsidies and tariﬀs, or tariﬀs and a protectionist product standard. Our model
can explain how this can be observed in a political equilibrium in which the government has low
bargaining power with respect to SIG (so the use of ineﬃcient policies would be prevalent) and can
only partially limit the use of some redistributive policies.
Proposition 3 also contains an interesting prediction that is potentially testable. The use of
ineﬃcient policies should be more prevalent when the government has low bargaining power. The
opposite is true if γ is high. This can be tested across countries, states or within a country if we
can rank a government’s bargaining power versus diﬀerent lobbies. The theory mapping alternating
oﬀers to Nash bargaining provides some guidance for what might determine γ, which could be used
for this ranking.
6 Equilibrium Redistribution Policy
Up to now, we have assumed that the government can unilaterally choose the cap on the eﬃcient
policy, or, in the binary case, the redistribution policy itself. In such a case, the equilibrium redistri-
bution policy or set of policies is simply the one that is optimal from the government’s perspective,
as given in propositions 3 and 2. In this section we consider two simple extensions of the model that
incorporate the “demand” for policy by those aﬀected. First, we allow lobbies to bargain with the
government over the policy to be used in the ﬁrst stage. Second, we allow for elections to choose
a policymaker, where all candidates value both welfare and lobby goods as before, but where they
diﬀer in the value that they place on social welfare. We show that our results are generally robust to
22these extensions.
6.1 Bargaining over the equilibrium redistribution policy
Thus far we have assumed that the government makes the ﬁrst stage choice of a cap or policy to
maximize its welfare or (as in some of our examples) that the policy or cap is exogenously speciﬁed.
These assumptions seem at least as reasonable as assuming that lobbies have full control over the
policy choice (as in the menu-auction approach, which derives a gain from the use of ineﬃcient policies
for lobbies that it argues explains their use in equilibrium). In practice the most reasonable case is
one where the government cannot fully commit to a cap or the use of a single policy, so that both
the government and lobby inﬂuence the choice of the policy. We now discuss this case in greater
detail and show that even if we allow the lobby to bargain over the redistribution policy with the
government in the ﬁrst stage, the ineﬃcient policy may still be used in equilibrium.
There are numerous ways in which we could model the government interaction with the lobby
in the ﬁrst stage. Our main objective here is to eliminate the asymmetry in the previous sections
that arises from allowing the government to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer on the cap or policy
choice. We therefore maintain the rest of the structure of the model and simply allow the lobby and
the government to bargain over the policy (cap) in the ﬁrst stage. To remain consistent with the
original setup we do not allow any other instruments or transfers to be bargained over in that initial
stage. Below we will provide a valid reason why each individual lobby will be unwilling to make any
transfers to the government in the ﬁrst stage for a particular policy to be available (or not capped)
in the second stage. For now we simply assume this.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a cap on eﬃcient transfers when ineﬃcient policies are also available,
as discussed in section 4. As shown in proposition 2 when the government can choose caps it sets a
binding cap on T provided neither party has all the bargaining power in the second stage, when the
level of the policies are determined. If instead we allowed lobbies to set the cap, they would choose
a non-binding cap. Each of these outcomes can be seen as the extreme when each side has all the
bargaining power in the ﬁrst stage. Suppose now that the government’s bargaining power in the ﬁrst
stage is γ1. Note that in general we would expect γ1 to diﬀer from γ, the bargaining power once
the policy has been decided on. The reason for this is that the parties are bargaining over diﬀerent
things in the two stages: the choice of transfer policy or cap in the ﬁrst stage as opposed to the level
of the policy and transfers in the second.20
20Even a narrow interpretation of γ when Nash bargaining represents alternating oﬀers suggests that the risk of
breakdown may be diﬀe r e n ta tt h ed i ﬀerent stages.
23The threat point in the ﬁrst stage is as before g0,v 0, the no bargaining outcome. In the special
case where γ1 = γ allowing for bargaining in the ﬁrst stage leads to the unconstrained Nash solution
and therefore only the eﬃcient policy is used. To see why, note that Nash bargaining in the ﬁrst stage
implies that the cap is jointly eﬃcient. When the bargaining power is identical in the two stages, the
Nash product being maximized in the ﬁrst stage is the same as in the second stage. Since the Pareto
frontier in the ﬁrst stage includes the point with a non-binding cap and this has the highest joint
surplus, it is the solution. The same is true if government bargaining power is lower in the ﬁrst stage
than in the second, i.e. if γ1 < γ. This is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the Pareto frontier in
the ﬁrst stage as the non-dashed curve through N,w h e nTc = TN, Nc0
, Tc = TNc,a n d g0, Tc =0 .
In contrast, when the government has more bargaining power in the ﬁrst stage, i.e. γ1 > γ,
a binding cap results and the ineﬃc i e n tp o l i c yi su s e di ne q u i l i b r i u mi fa n do n l yi fn e i t h e rs i d e
has all the bargaining power in the second stage. Such a solution is illustrated by Nb in ﬁgure
7. The intuition for this result is that, when γ1 > γ,c h o o s i n gTc to maximize joint utility in the
ﬁrst stage, (G(CNc(Tc),TNc(Tc),t Nc(Tc))−g0)γ1(V (CNc(Tc),TNc(Tc),t Nc(Tc)−v0)1−γ1,r e q u i r e sa
higher utility for the government than the unconstrained Nash level, which maximizes (G(C,T,t))−
g0)γ(V (C,T,t−v0)1−γ. This argument relies on the fact that as Tc → TN t h es l o p eo ft h ec o n s t r a i n e d
frontier becomes identical to that of the unconstrained one, as previously shown. It seems plausible
that γ1 > γ since in the ﬁrst stage the only instrument that is bargained over is under the control
of the government—a particular type of legislation. So, given this condition is satisﬁed, allowing for
lobbies to bargain over the cap on T does not eliminate the result that the equilibrium redistribution
policy is the ineﬃcient one.
Things are more complex with binary choice of policies, since the result of ﬁrst-stage bargaining
cannot be a policy somewhere between the policy preferred by the government and that preferred
by the lobby. One way of representing the possible outcome of bargaining when choices are discrete
in the ﬁrst stage is as follows. With some probability ρ the government chooses the policy and with
probability 1 − ρ, the lobby chooses the policy. Previously we assumed ρ =1a n ds h o w e dt h a t
under the conditions in proposition 3 the equilibrium policy is the ineﬃcient one. More generally, if
whenever the government has some bargaining power it has a non-zero probability of being able to
choose the policy then we still observe t as the equilibrium redistribution policy with probability ρ if
the conditions in proposition 3 hold.21
We have allowed bargaining only over the choice of policy or cap in the initial stage. But if the
21If one made the further reasonable assumption that the probability ρ that the government chooses the policy is
increasing in γ, then the probability of the policy being ineﬃcient (when γ < γ
∗)i si n c r e a s i n gi nγ.
24ineﬃcient policy is chosen in the ﬁrst stage, there will potentially be unexplored gains from bargaining.
One may therefore ask why any given lobby i would not oﬀer a side-payment to the government, for
example, some of the lobby good, in exchange for the government using the eﬃcient policy towards it,
leaving both sides at least as well oﬀ as under the ineﬃcient policy. One answer is that each individual
lobby may not ﬁnd it optimal to do this due to a free riding problem across lobbies. Suppose that
whenever the government chooses a more eﬃcient policy in place of another relatively ineﬃcient one,
it does so through an agreement or legislation that necessarily applies to several sectors, so that if
the government agrees to switch redistribution policies for one lobby it may need to do so for all.
Hence, there is a basic collective action problem. In the absence of coordination across lobbies and
if no individual lobby can make itself better oﬀ when it compensates the government for the loss
of switching to the eﬃcient policy for all lobbies we should not expect side payments used in the
ﬁrst stage. This can justify the type of bargaining we model above that can predict an ineﬃcient
equilibrium redistribution policy even if we allow the lobbies to inﬂuence it.22
6.2 Majority support for ineﬃcient redistribution policies
Suppose now that the choice of redistribution policy is subject to a referendum or, alternatively, that
there are several politicians who diﬀer only in their known valuation of social welfare, a.W ea s s u m e
that a may be large but not inﬁnite, that is, all politicians value lobby goods. The question we ask
is the following: Will the ineﬃcient policy ever be voted for or, alternatively, will a politician that
implements the ineﬃcient policy ever be elected? We consider the second alternative, voting over
politicians with known characteristics.
The electoral setup is simple. Voting is costless (and sincere in the two candidate election), with
a voter’s choices depending only on the known (and immutable) characteristics of the candidates.23
A politician Px(ax,γx), whose type is known by all, if elected chooses the policy that maximizes his
welfare in bargaining with the organized lobbies.
To study election outcomes, we must derive voter preferences over the politicians. There are
three groups of voters with potentially diﬀerent voting preferences: organized owners of capital
i ∈ L, unorganized owners, j, and workers. As will become clear, the latter two groups have similar
22Alternatively if we allowed the government to make exceptions it may still be possible for the ineﬃcient policy to
emerge in equilibrium if those exceptions are suﬃciently costly for the government to negotiate once the rule has been
decided.
23Since the voters in our model are rational and have full information they are not “impressionable”. That is they
cannot be persuaded to vote for someone by campaigning and so contributions are not useful in electing politicians.
This further reinforces our interpretation of Ci as lobby goods valued by a politician in oﬃce, independently of elections,
rather than as contributions.
25preferences over the politicians considered. Moreover, for a given redistribution policy the latter two
groups prefer a politician that will deliver higher social welfare.
The qualitative outcome in the case with optimal caps is trivial. All politicians that value both
social welfare and C favor caps as shown in propositions 1 and 2, which implies that any elected
politician will set a cap and t will be used in equilibrium. Therefore we focus on the less trivial
binary choice case of section 5.
If elected, a politician of type Px(ax,γx) will choose t or T depending on which maximizes his
objective G(a,.).I fγ < γ∗(a) for a given politician (and condition (a)(ii) in proposition 3 holds), he
chooses t.B u tγ∗ depends on a, as is clear from (14). Thus, two politicians with similar γ may have
diﬀerent preferences over the transfer policy. Given that this is a full information model the voters
know the politician’s type and therefore which policy he will implement after he is elected. Therefore
they vote not on the basis of a alone but on the basis of the welfare outcome under alternative
politicians, which again depends on his optimal redistribution policy.
We begin by characterizing the preferences of the three groups in a special but important case,
which will be important for characterizing election outcomes.
Lemma 2: Under a politician Px(ax,γ = γ∗(ax)), both unorganized capital owners and workers
prefer the ineﬃcient policy t to T, while organized capital owners prefer T to t. Hence, under
politician Px(ax,γ = γ∗(ax)),am a j o r i t yp r e f e r st to T if and only if workers and unorganized capital
owners are in the majority, that is, iﬀ
P
i∈L αi < 0.5.
Proof: See appendix.
The lemma states that when a politician who is indiﬀerent between t and T is in power, then a
majority prefers the ineﬃcient policy if and only if organized capital owners are the minority. Recall
that we assume concentrated ownership of capital in each organized sector, so the condition in the
lemma further requires that organized capital owners are a minority of the voting population, which
is reasonable.
The intuition for the result is simple. The ineﬃcient policy reduces the total bargaining surplus
between the politician and lobbies is reduced (see Lemma 1). Therefore the lobby is worse oﬀ with
t.W h e n t rather than T is used, equilibrium C is lower, so that Ψ(C) is lower as well. Since
G = aW + Ψ(C), if the government is indiﬀerent between t and T,i tm u s tb et h a ts o c i a lw e l f a r eW
under t is higher. Since social welfare is the aggregation of welfare for workers and the unorganized
and organized capital owners, if organized capital owners are worse oﬀ under t (as just argued) the
welfare of workers and unorganized capital owners mu s tb eh i g h e r .M o r e o v e r ,i ti ss i m p l et os h o w( s e e
26t h ep r o o f )t h a tt h el a t t e rt w og r o u p sh a v et h es a m ep references over the choice of transfer policies
and thus if they are better oﬀ on aggregate, then each of these two subgroups is better oﬀ.
On the basis of Lemma 2, we can consider election (and hence policy) outcomes when voters
choose between candidates with diﬀerent a, that is, weight on social welfare, but the same bargaining
power γ towards lobbies. If we consider a contest between a candidate whose a makes him indiﬀerent
between the two policies and one with a diﬀerent a (but the same γ), the policy choice of the latter
will depend on how γ∗ changes with a.I fdγ∗/da > 0, then over some range of a and γ politicians
who care more about social welfare are more likely to choose ineﬃcient policies. If dγ∗/da < 0,t h e n
politicians who care less about social welfare are more likely to choose ineﬃcient policies. Although
the ﬁrst case, dγ∗/da > 0, appears counterintuitive it may be possible, so that we must consider
both cases. To understand why, recall from Lemma 2 that at γ∗,s o c i a lw e l f a r eW is higher under t
than T. Since the direct eﬀect of an increase in a for the politician at given policy levels is W,t h e
utility of a politician Px(ax,γ = γ∗(ax)) increases by more under t,s oa th i g h e ra he would choose t.
Hence, the direct eﬀect implies a higher γ∗, raising the possibility that politicians with higher a are
more likely to choose ineﬃcient policies, at least over some range. However, higher a also changes
the equilibrium level of the policies, lowering transfers and C. The net eﬀect of this second channel
under t relative to T is ambiguous and will generally depend on the other parameters of the model
and the functional form of π and Ψ.24
The timing is now as follows. In the ﬁrst stage there is an election to choose the policymaker.
All politicians share γ but some politicians diﬀer in their a,w h e r ea is bounded, so no politician is
a social welfare maximizer. Once the politician is elected he bargains with the lobby over the value
of the transfer policy voted and C. Thus this last stage is as before in the binary choice section.
We may then show that rational voters may vote for a candidate who is known to implement the
ineﬃcient policy over one who would implement the eﬃcient policy.
Proposition 4 :
When dγ∗/da > 0 a politician Pt(at >a ,γ = γ∗(a)) implements the ineﬃcient policy. Moreover, if
P
i∈L αi < 0.5 then Pt wins a majority vote against all politicians with the same bargaining power
24To derive dγ
∗/da we must trace out the intersection of the government’s utility in ﬁgure 6. Formally we use (14)
to obtain dγ
∗/da = −(d ˆ G
t/da − d ˆ G
T/da)/(d ˆ G
t/dγ − d ˆ G
T/dγ).W h e n γ
∗ exists and (13) holds we know that the
denominator is negative at γ
∗,a si sc l e a rf r o mﬁgure 6. Therefore
sign(dγ
∗/da)=sign(d ˆ G
t/da − d ˆ G
T/da)
= sign(Ga(t) − Ga(T)+Gtta − GTTa +[ GCC
Nt
a ]C=CNt − [GCC
N
a ]C=CN)
27who implement T, PT(aT <a ,γ).
When dγ∗/da < 0 a politician Pt(at <a ,γ = γ∗(a)) implements the ineﬃcient policy. Moreover if
P
i∈L αi < 0.5 then Pt wins a majority vote against all politicians with the same bargaining power
who implement T, PT(aT >a ,γ),u n l e s sPT cares suﬃciently more about social welfare than Pt, that
is unless aT − at is suﬃciently large.
Proof: See Appendix
The proposition provides the conditions under which a politician preferring the ineﬃcient policy
may win an election against one preferring the eﬃcient one. The ﬁrst case states that if the organized
lobbies are not the majority of the voters and dγ∗/da > 0, then a politician who implements t cannot
be beaten by any politician with the same bargaining power γ and lower a, including those who ﬁnd
T optimal. Workers and unorganized capital owners prefer Pt both because he has a higher a then
any politician that prefers T and because he chooses t. Politicians who place a higher weight on
social welfare are the ones that choose ineﬃcient policies and they are also the ones elected.
The second case in the proposition says that a politician that places lower value on social welfare
will be elected by the workers and unorganized capital owners provided that he chooses t and the
alternative candidate with the same γ has a suﬃciently high a to prefer T but not high enough to
oﬀset the extra social cost from doing so.25 In this case a higher value of a for a candidate who is
indiﬀerent between t and T works against him because it changes his optimal redistribution policy.
This switch to T implies a discrete fall in social welfare which is more than enough to oﬀset the
marginal increase in welfare from the higher a. Note that in this second case fully informed, rational
voters may choose the candidate with a lower weight on social welfare. They do so precisely because
he chooses the ineﬃcient policy implying higher equilibrium voter welfare.
In a way the result in proposition 4 stands in sharp contrast to the disguised transfer theory
as formalized for example by Coate and Morris (1995). They require asymmetric and imperfect
voter information about the eﬀects of policies and the politician type to show that we may obtain a
voting equilibrium where ineﬃcient redistribution policies are used. The proposition above shows that
this sort of result, in which elected politicians pursue ineﬃcient redistribution policies, is perfectly
consistent with rational, forward-looking voters who are fully informed and vote solely on the basis
of what type of redistribution policy will be used in equilibrium.
25Naturally if there exist candidates with suﬃciently high a (<∞) that can enter the race, as in some citizen-candidate
models, and dγ
∗/da < 0, then they would choose T and be elected. Our point is that if we consider two given candidates,
the one with lower a who chooses t over T may be elected for exactly that reason.
287C o n c l u s i o n
Why do governments use ineﬃcient policies to make transfers to SIG? This question has long puzzled
researchers in public economics, political economy and trade policy. We present an argument that
relies on two features of the interaction between the government and SIG that we think are general,
pervasive, and important. First, this interaction can be characterized as one where the two parties
bargain over what they have to oﬀer to each other. Second, the government has some ability to
commit to certain limits on the types and/or levels of the policies that it will later bargain over.
In such a world, a key consideration is the bargaining position of the government relative to the
lobbies. The government will beneﬁt if it can commit itself to oﬀer lower transfers for any given
amount of lobby goods that the SIG provides. As we demonstrated, this commitment increases the
welfare of the government because it improves its bargaining position. However, if the government
caps or foregoes the use of one instrument, lobbies will ﬁnd other, generally less eﬃcient ways to bar-
gain with the government. Hence, equilibrium redistribution is characterized by the use of ineﬃcient
instruments. If such instruments serve no social purpose, the government will also want to prohibit
their use, but it will certainly ﬁnd it impossible to eliminate every conceivable transfer to SIG. If
the ineﬃcient transfer has a social value at some point in time, such as a production subsidy to
correct an externality, the government will not ﬁnd it optimal to prohibit its use. However, it is then
impossible to eﬀectively forbid its use as a redistributive device. Focussing on the case in which the
ineﬃcient instrument is known to have no social purpose makes clear that the use of ineﬃcient ways
of transferring income to SIG is completely independent of any motive related to lack of transparency
and imperfect information.
When the government has the ability to choose caps optimally, eﬃcient and ineﬃcient transfers
will both be used (or, more generally, several types of policies may be used simultaneously). In
practice, the government may not be able to choose interior values for caps and may thus face a
binary problem of choosing between eﬃcient and ineﬃcient transfer policies. The same arguments
apply, so that a government with low bargaining power may choose to forego the use of eﬃcient
transfers and use only ineﬃcient ones to improve its bargaining position. Hence, our bargaining
approach can explain why ineﬃcient transfers are used instead of eﬃcient ones. Even when the
government cannot fully commit to a cap or the use of a single policy, so that the government and
lobby bargain over the redistribution policy, the ineﬃcient policy may still be used in equilibrium.
In an electoral framework we found that rational, fully informed voters may prefer the candidate
who chooses the ineﬃcient policy to one who chooses the eﬃc i e n to n e .F o rt h es a m er e a s o nt h e ym a y
29prefer the candidate who puts a lower weight on social welfare because they know the improvement
in the government’s bargaining position relative to the SIGs that this implies will lead to higher social
welfare. These voter preferences do not reﬂect imperfect information about candidates or the eﬀect
of transfers, as in many models. Moreover, these results suggest the importance of looking at the
interaction of voting models with lobbying models, but in a framework where neither government nor
lobbies have all the bargaining power as in the approach to SIGs put forward here.
The model also provides a rationale for commitment via international agreements other than as
a solution to time inconsistency problems, as is often suggested. In our approach the gain to the
government from self-restraint (which might be achieved via international agreements) is explained
by the improvement in its bargaining position relative to the lobby.
We chose a speciﬁc application to demonstrate a general mechanism that appears to be commonly
used in practice by governments: restraining the amount they can oﬀer in a subsequent bargain. A
similar rationale can potentially explain the choice of ineﬃcient transfer policies other than production
and export subsidies. As pointed out above, it can also apply in diﬀerent political economy settings
provided that the key bargaining elements are present.
Finally, our results highlight an important methodological issue about the interaction of gov-
ernments and SIG. Models that assign all the bargaining power to either party will fail to explain
interesting outcomes, which suggests the high value to investigating alternative approaches to the
interaction between governments and SIG. That is the more general aim of our line of research.
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31APPENDICES
AF o r m a l D e ﬁnition of the Political Equilibrium
In this appendix we provide a formal deﬁnition of the political equilibrium described in section 4
when there are i =1 ,...,N SIG.
The set ({ˆ Tc
i },{ˆ Ti},{ˆ ti},{ ˆ Ci}) for i =1 ,...N forms a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game







i ), ˆ Ti(Tc
i ),ˆ ti(Tc
i )) all i (15)
2. Levels of T,t and C
( ˆ Ci, ˆ Ti,ˆ ti) ≡ arg max
(G,Vi)∈Ω
(G − g0)γ(Vi − v0
i )1−γ (16)
where Ω ≡ {(G,Vi) ∈ Pe : G ≥ G0,V i ≥ V 0
i } [Pareto frontier]
and
i. g0 ≡ maxTi≥0,ti≥0{G(Ci,T i(Tc
i ),t i(Tc
i ))} [Threat point for government]
ii. v0
i ≡ maxCi≥0{V0(Ci,T i,t i} [Threat point for lobby]
iii. (G,Vi) ∈ Pe iﬀ
(G,Vi) ∈ P [Set of feasible utilities for the problem] and
@ (G,Vi) s.t. Ti ∈ [0, ˆ Tc
i ]; [Deﬁning constrained eﬃciency] and
a. G(Ci,T i,t i) ≥ G( ˆ Ci, ˆ Ti,ˆ ti) and Vi(Ci,T i,t i) >V i( ˆ Ci, ˆ Ti,ˆ ti) or
b. G(Ci,T i,t i) >G ( ˆ Ci, ˆ Ti,ˆ ti) and Vi(Ci,T i,t i) ≥ Vi( ˆ Ci, ˆ Ti,ˆ ti) .
B Production subsidies as eﬃcient transfer policies
Lemma 1: A production subsidy t is an ineﬃcient transfer policy relative to T iﬀ no production
externality is present.
Proof:
Suﬃciency: Consider the case where no externality is present, so that the economically optimal level
of t is t∗ =0 . Deriving a contract curve in T −t space for any given level of C, the deﬁnition requires
that such a curve contain no points such that t>0. For this to true, it must be the case that t>0








[π0(p + ˆ t)β + tπ00(p + t)]/β > π0(p + ˆ t)
This is always satisﬁed given the convexity of the proﬁt function. Note that these equations imply
that at t =0we have Gt/GT = Vt/VT.
Necessity: Suppose a positive production externality is present. The optimal level of subsidy to
address the externality is given by:
text : Gext
t =0
Where Gext is the government objective reﬂecting the externality. For t ≥ text to be ineﬃcient, it















i(p + ˆ t)]t≥text (17)
But since Gext
t (t = text)=0by the deﬁnition of text and π0(p + t = text) > 0, (17) cannot hold.
Hence, t is not ineﬃcient when an externality is present. ¤
CP r o o f s
Proposition 1:
In the absence of alternative transfer policies to lobbies the government chooses a cap on the eﬃcient
transfer that is strictly binding at (CN,TN) iﬀ neither player has all the bargaining power.
Proof: Suﬃciency:
Suppose that γ ∈ (0,1). We need only show the existence of a cap such that Tc <T N and
G(CNc,TNc) >G (CN,TN). The solution is illustrated in Figure 3. We ﬁrst show that the con-
strained Pareto frontier is strictly concave. On the basis of that, we then show that gNc >g N.
The constrained Pareto frontier in Figure 3 coincides with the original one for T ≤ Tc and thus its
slope is simply GT
VT up to point (CN,Tc).F r o m( 7 )w eh a v eGT
GC = VT
VC at (CN,Tc) so that GT
VT = GC
VC .
The rest of the constrained frontier is strictly interior to the unconstrained frontier and has a slope
of GC
VC ,r e ﬂecting the ratio of changes in welfare as the amount of the lobby good provided changes.
Moreover,
GC(CN)
VC = −Ψ0(CN) > −Ψ0(C<C N)=
GC(C<CN)
VC , from the deﬁnitions of G and V as
well as Ψ00 < 0, so the constrained frontier is strictly concave. Now deﬁne point A in Figure 3 as the
intersection of the constrained frontier and G = gN. Since the constrained frontier is strictly concave
and gmc = gm for Tc ≥ T0 (see Figure 2), the segment connecting gm and A is everywhere below the
constrained Pareto frontier.
Consider then an auxiliary problem where the Pareto frontier is deﬁned by the straight line through
gm and A, which has some slope m.F o rany linear Pareto frontier the government equilibrium utility
is gN − g0 = γ(gm − g0) (from (10)). Since the straight line through gm and A is a rotation of the
original Pareto frontier inwards around gm, and since gm − g0 and γ are unchanged in the auxiliary
problem, the equilibrium government utility is also unchanged. Therefore if we derive the ﬁrst-order
condition for this auxiliary problem as we do for (8) we obtain −UV
UG|A = m. Strict concavity of
the constrained frontier implies that at A, m>GC
VC |A, the slope of the constrained frontier at A.
Therefore, the equilibrium point NC lies to the northwest of A,i m p l y i n ggNc >g N.
Necessity.
If γ =1then the unconstrained solution is gm ≡ MaxC,TG s.t. V = V 0 . The equilibrium transfer is
TN(γ =1 )=T0. A strictly binding cap entails that the government’s utility is now gmc ≡ MaxC,TG
s.t. V = V 0 and Tc <T0, the extra constraint implies that gmc <g m.
If γ =0then the second stage Nash bargaining solution is GNc(TNc,CNc)=G(0,0). The government
is therefore indiﬀerent among all values of Tc, which implies that there exist Tc ≥ TN (that is, caps
that are not strictly binding) that are subgame perfect equilibria. ¤
Proposition 2:
In the political equilibrium, there is:
a. a cap on the eﬃcient transfer, T, that is strictly binding iﬀ neither player has all the bargaining
33power; and
b. use of the relatively ineﬃcient transfer policy, t.
Proof:
a. Tc binds iﬀ the government does not have all the bargaining power.




dTc ≡ GCCTc +GTTTc +Gtt.N o t et h a tTTc =1since a marginal increase in the binding cap
Tc will induce an equivalent increase in the transfer. Thus, to show the gain from capping T,ap r o o f
similar to that in proposition 1 applies provided that the Pareto frontier is strictly concave when Tc
binds and t is available.
T h es l o p eo ft h eP a r e t of r o n t i e ri sGT
VT if Tc is not binding. If Tc binds then any further increases in
the utility of the lobby must take place via changes in C being exchanged for t,s i n c ea sw ew i l ls e e
tc > 0 when the externality is suﬃciently important. Thus, if Tc binds, the slope is Gtdt−GCdC
Vtdt−VCdC = Gt
Vt
since the equilibrium deﬁnition requires t and C to be set eﬃciently, i.e. for Gt
GC = Vt














where the ﬁrst equality is due to the deﬁnition of G and V .( A ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a1i n
the appendix, as t → 0, Gt
Vt = GT
VT , that is, the utility frontier for eﬃcient and ineﬃcient transfers
has the same slope.) The inequality follows from the deﬁnition of t being ineﬃcient relative to T.
Thus the constrained Pareto frontier is strictly concave and we can apply the proof of proposition 1
to show that ˆ Tc binds.
b. ˆ t>0 in equilibrium.
Suppose ˆ t =0 .S i n c e Tc is optimally chosen and binds the constrained solution would lie at the
point where the new Pareto frontier meets the original one in Figure 4. However, since the unique
unconstrained solution was ˆ t =0 ,TN >T c and the slope of the frontiers is identical when ˆ t =0the
constrained solution cannot be Tc,ˆ t =0 . ¤
Proposition 3:
a. Given a discrete choice of the transfer policy to use in bargaining with a lobby the government
chooses a relatively more ineﬃcient transfer, t, instead of T if:
i. limγ→0(1/Ω0t)/(1/Ω0T) > limγ→0 ΩT/Ωt and
ii. γ ∈ (0,γ∗)
b. Moreover, there exists a γ ∈ [γ∗,1) s.t. the government always chooses T when γ ∈ (γ,1].
Proof:
a. When γ =0we have G(0,t Nt(γ),CNt(γ)) = G(TN(γ),0,CN)=g0.E q u a t i o n ( 1 3 ) i s t h u s
suﬃcient to show (12) is satisﬁed for γ ∈ (0,γ∗). To evaluate (13), we ﬁrst use the implicit function
theorem to obtain limγ→0 dg/dγ =l i m γ→0 −ˆ LGγ/ˆ LGG where ˆ L is the Nash product evaluated at the
solution of the following program
MaxG≥g0L ≡ (G − g0)γ(Ω(G − g0))1−γ
34The FOC LG =0is
γ(
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Using this we have ˆ LGγ = ˆ L/(1 − γ)(ˆ G−g0) and ˆ LGG =( −γ( 1
1−γ)+(1−γ)ˆ Ω00 ( ˆ G−g0)2
ˆ Ω )ˆ L/( ˆ G−g0)2,
which we use to obtain after some simpliﬁcation
lim
γ→0








Therefore (13) reduces to the condition in (i): limγ→0(1/ˆ Ω0t)/(1/ˆ Ω0T) > limγ→0 ˆ ΩT/ˆ Ωt.
b. At γ =1we have gm >g mt thus the government chooses T. Since the inequality is strict and G
is continuous in γ (G is continuous in the policies and (tNt(γ),CNt(γ)) and TN(γ) are continuous in
γ)w ec a nﬁnd a γ < 1 s.t. gN(γ)=gNt(γ). If (14) has a unique solution, then γ = γ∗.O t h e r w i s eγ
is the maximum γ that satisﬁes (14).¤
Lemma 2: Under Px(ax,γ = γ∗(ax)),am a j o r i t yp r e f e r st to T iﬀ
P
i∈L αi < 0.5.
Proof: Organized Sectors:S i n c et is ineﬃcient the joint surplus from bargaining with each lobby is
lower relative to T a ss h o w ni nl e m m a1 .Px is indiﬀerent between t and T by the deﬁnition of γ∗.
Therefore each lobby is worse oﬀ under t and prefers T.T h e ya r eam a j o r i t yw h e n
P
i∈L αi > 0.5.
Unorganized Sectors and Workers: To show that unorganized sectors j and workers ` prefer t to T
under Px(ax,γx = γ∗(ax)), we show that ﬁrst that CNt <C N and then that this implies total social
welfare is higher under t than T when the politician’s bargaining power is γx = γ∗(ax). Since the
organized lobbies are worse oﬀ under t, other groups must be better oﬀ.
Step 1: CNt <C N —F r o m( 7 )w eh a v eΨ0(CN)=
aβ
1−β when only T is used. The contract curve when
only t is used is deﬁned by Gt
GC = Vt






(1 − β)π0(p + t)
so that Ψ0(CNt)−Ψ0(CN)=
atπ00(p+t)
(1−β)π0(p+t) > 0, where the inequality follows from π0,π00 > 0. Ψ0(CNt) >
Ψ0(CN)= ⇒ CNt <C N because Ψ00 < 0.
Step 2: ˆ W(0,t(ax,γx = γ∗(ax)) > ˆ W(T(ax,γx = γ∗(ax),0) at γ∗ — From the deﬁnition of γ∗ in (14)
we have G(0,t Nt(γ∗),CNt(γ∗)) = G(TN(γ∗),0,CN),s ot h a t




where the inequality follows from CNt
i <C N
i .
Step 3: ˆ W`(0,t(ax,γx = γ∗(ax)) > ˆ W`(T(ax,γx = γ∗(ax),0) for workers and ˆ Wj(0,t(ax,γx =
γ∗(ax)) > ˆ Wj(T(ax,γx = γ∗(ax),0) for unorganized sectors— We can decompose social welfare as:






































i − V t
i + CN
i − CNt
i ) > 0
where the last inequality follows from the ineﬃciency of t and the fact that at γ∗ the government is




















When dγ∗/da > 0 a politician Pt(at >a ,γ = γ∗(a)) implements the ineﬃcient policy. Moreover, if P
i∈L αi < 0.5 then Pt wins a majority vote against all politicians with the same bargaining power
that implement T, PT(aT <a ,γ).
When dγ∗/da < 0 a politician Pt(at <a ,γt = γ∗(a)) implements the ineﬃcient policy. Moreover if P
i∈L αi < 0.5 then Pt wins a majority vote against all politicians with the same bargaining power
that implement T, PT(aT >a ,γ),u n l e s sPT cares suﬃciently more about social welfare than Pt, that
is unless aT − at > 0 is suﬃciently large.
Proof:
Case 1: dγ∗/da > 0. Now a politician with higher a (l o w e ra) prefers t(T ). For example Pt(at >
a,γt = γ∗(a)) prefers t since γt = γ∗(a) < γ∗(at >a ).S of o rag i v e nγ only a politician with lower
a implements T. Since according to lemma 2 the majority of voters prefer t when γ = γ∗(a) and for
a given policy voters prefer politicians which place higher value on social welfare they always elect a
politician that implements the ineﬃcient policy.
Case 2: dγ∗/da < 0. Now a politician with lower a (higher a) prefers t (T) .S i n c elimε→0(Wt(t(a −
ε,γ∗(a−ε))) >WT(T(a+ε,γ∗(a+ε)))) there is some ε > 0 s.t. Wt(t(a−ε,γ∗(a−ε))) >WT(T(a+
ε,γ∗(a + ε))) and thus there is always some ε > 0 s.t. Pt(at = a − ε,γt = γ∗(a)) is elected. As ε
increases Wt(t(a−ε,γ∗(a−ε)) falls and WT(T(a+ε,γ∗(a+ε))) increases until for some suﬃciently
large ε they are equal.¤
D Slope of the Contract Curve with Production Subsidies
In this appendix, we show that as long as the supply function is not too concave or convex, the













(1 − β)π0(p + t)























= −sign((π00(p + t)+tπ000(p + t))π0(p + t) − t(π00(p + t))2)









|CC)=−sign(π0(p + t) − tπ00(p + t)) < 0
Since when π000 → 0 we have π00(p+t) ≈ π0(p+t)/(p+t) and thus we can rewrite (π00(p+t)+tπ000(p+
t))π0(p + t) − t(π00(p + t))2 ≈ {1 − t/(p + t))}(π0(p + t))2/(p + t) > 0.
Note also that if sign(dC
dt |CC) < 0 then the Pareto frontier when t is used is globally concave. To
see this note that the slope of the Pareto frontier is GC/VC. It is globally concave if lobby goods
are higher when the government has more bargaining power, ensured by sign(dC
dt |CC) < 0 ,a n d
(GC/VC)|Chigh >(GC/VC)|Clow,w h i c hi se n s u r e ds i n c eΨ00 < 0 and VC = −1.
ES i m u l a t i o n
Assumptions: Ψ ≡ Cψ,ψ ∈ (0,1); q ≡ k1−αlα =⇒ π(p + t)=( p + t)k(α(p + t))
α
1−α,α = .5.





Ω0T =l i m
γ→0









The ﬁrst equality is due to the deﬁnition of Ω, the second is due to the ﬁrst-order condition in (7).
The last equality follows from the deﬁnition of V mT,w h e r eTm represents the maximum transfer the
lobby can extract and is deﬁned by:































Ω0t =l i m
γ→0
Ψ0(CNt)(V − v0) (23)
=l i m
γ→0
a(βπ0(p + t)+tπ00(p + t))
(1 − β)π0(p + t)
(V mT − v0)
The ﬁrst equality, is due to the deﬁnition of Ω, the expression for Ψ0(CNt) in the second equality
is derived from the eﬃciency condition: Gt/GC = Vt/VC.U s i n g t h e d e ﬁnition of V we obtain
V mt −v0 = π(p+tN(γ =0 ) )−Cmt −π(p) where Cmt is the minimum level of the good provided by
the lobby required to maintain the government at the reservation utility. Using the deﬁnition of G
we can write Cmt as
G(T =0 ,t=0 ,C=0 )=G(T =0 ,t= tN(γ =0 ) ,Cmt)
Cmt = Ψ−1(−a(π(p + tN(γ =0 ) )− π(p) − tπ0(p + tN(γ =0 ) ) /(1 − β))) (24)






a(βπ0(p + tN)+tNπ00(p + tN))
(1 − β)π0(p + tN)






















To calculate this we require the equilibrium t, which is obtained using the eﬃciency condition
Gt/GC = Vt/VC and (24):
tN : Ψ−1(−a(π(p + t) − π(p) − tπ0(p + t)/(1 − β))) = Ψ0−1(
a(βπ0(p + t)+tπ00(p + t))
(1 − β)π0(p + t)
)
tN :( ( −a(0.5(p + t)





(1 − β)k(p + t)
))−1/(1−ψ)
Evaluating (22) and (25) at the parameter values below we obtain the results in table 1 in section
5.2.
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